{"id":1340,"date":"2011-02-09T09:13:37","date_gmt":"2011-02-09T08:13:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/?p=1340"},"modified":"2011-02-09T09:13:50","modified_gmt":"2011-02-09T08:13:50","slug":"choice-is-not-preference","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/2011\/02\/09\/choice-is-not-preference\/","title":{"rendered":"choice is not preference"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>There is a beauty to the arrangement whereby a cake is shared by one of us dividing it and the other choosing which part they want. The person dividing doesn&#8217;t know which part they&#8217;ll get so they have every incidentive to make fair shares. They say that John Rawls took this as inspiration for <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Original_position\">his philosophy<\/a> of how a just society should be organised (but I don&#8217;t know enough about that).<\/p>\n<p>But the cake cutting example only works for a world where the cake is homogeneous and the two cake-eaters have identical preferences (in this case, to have as much as possible). Imagine a world where the cake has a fruit half and a nut half, say, and I have two cake-eaters, A and B. A likes fruit and nut equally, she doesn&#8217;t care. B is allergic to nuts. Now the game of &#8220;one cuts, one chooses&#8221; doesn&#8217;t work. If A cuts she will slice the cake in half and be happy with whichever half she&#8217;s left with, but B better hope that A makes a half which is entirely fruit, otherwise she&#8217;ll be forced to make a choice between two bits of cake, some of which she can&#8217;t eat. B is at no risk of losing out, A is at substantial risk. If B cuts first, she might consider cutting the cake into a nut half and a fruit half, but then she has to hope A chooses the fruit half. And she might cut the cake into mixed halves an put up with a portion she can&#8217;t eat (but ensuring B only gets half the cake). The game-theoretic solution is probably to cut the cake into a larger, nut-plus-small-amount-of-fruit, half and a smaller, just-fruit, half. A will choose the larger half. A definitely wins, B loses out.<\/p>\n<p>The solution whereby A and B both have half, and both enjoy their halves equally (ie B gets the fruit half) is simple, but enreachable via this sharing game.<\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;m reminded of an experiment I think I read about in George Ainslie&#8217;s <a href=\"http:\/\/picoeconomics.org\/\">Breakdown of Will<\/a> (don&#8217;t have the book to hand to check, so apologies for inaccuracies. We can pretend it is a thought experiment and I think it still makes the point). There&#8217;s a large long cage with a lever that opens a door at the other end. If you are a pig it take 15 seconds, say, to run from the lever to the door. After 20 seconds the door closes, so you get to eat your fill for 5 seconds. One pig on her own gets regular opportunities to feed, as well as plenty of exercise running backward and forth. Now imagine a big pig and a small pig. The big pig is a bully and always pushes the small pig off any food. In a cage with normal feeding arrangements the big pig gets all the food (poor small pig!). But in this bizarre long cage with the lever-for-food arrangement, a funny thing happens. The big pig ends up as a lever pressing slave for the small pig, who gets to eat all the foot.<\/p>\n<p>To see why, we need a game-theory analysis like with the cake example. If the little pig pressed the lever, the big pig would start eating the food and the little pig wouldn&#8217;t be able to budge her. There&#8217;s no incentive for the little pig to press the lever, she doesn&#8217;t get any food either way! The big pig, however, has a different choice : if she presses the lever then she can charge down to the food and knock the little pig out of the way, getting 5 seconds of food. It&#8217;s worth it for big pig, but the outcome is that she does all the running and only gets a quarter of the food.<\/p>\n<p>This suprising result is none the less a &#8216;behaviourally stable strategy&#8217;, to bastardise <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Evolutionary_stable_strategy\">a phrase<\/a> from evolutionary game theory.<\/p>\n<p>Bottom line: minimally complex environments and heteogenities in agents&#8217; abilities and preferences break simple fairness games. In anything like the real world, as Tom Slee so convincingly shows, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.web.net\/~tslee\/\">choice is not preference<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>There is a beauty to the arrangement whereby a cake is shared by one of us dividing it and the other choosing which part they want. The person dividing doesn&#8217;t know which part they&#8217;ll get so they have every incidentive to make fair shares. They say that John Rawls took this as inspiration for his [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[22,11],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1340","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-intellectual-self-defence","category-systems"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p5KQtW-lC","jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1340"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1340"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1340\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1344,"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1340\/revisions\/1344"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1340"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1340"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idiolect.org.uk\/notes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1340"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}