Because our values have arisen in a process of debate, inference and generalisation, they are no longer even distant consequences of our basic needs. Our nature arises from choices that were not determined by our biological make-up. It is enabled, but not determined, by biology.
So writes Ronnie de Sousa in an essay for Aeon called ‘Natural-born existentialists‘
I accept that nature doesn’t tell us what we ought to desire. I also think that some of what feel like our most essential desires are social products. Here’s an extreme example of that: If I was born a viking warrior I would want to die in battle (or at least want to want that). Viking-me would recognise that desire as defining of my self, but from our modern standpoint we also recognise that it is entirely an accident of history. Those of us who want to die in battle, or to avenge their honour, we seek to rehabilitate, not encourage.
If some of our most strongly held desires are social products, and there is no divine or biological nature which tells us which desires are good or bad, how do we know which desires should be the foundation for our selves, and which we should disavow, and so strive to un-want?
Possibly related: moral dumbfounding. When we cannot explain our intuitions, when is this evidence that they are, or should be axiomatic, and when is it evidence that we have no sound basis for what we belief and we should abandon our beliefs?
Clues, perspectives, historical and empirical notes welcome!
One reply on “Seeking perspectives: how to arbitrate among our desires?”
Well according to Hegel the whole of human history is us working this out through a two-way iterative process of society moulding and creating individuals, and individuals moulding and creating society, and gradually we, hopefully, move towards greater human flourishing, assuming that that is what we all deeply want, but can’t do on our own.
I don’t really understand the details of this, but broadly I think that he is onto something.